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Growing concerns about small-scale, low sophistication terrorist attacks, 
and the difficulties they present for security services, make public 
coproduction of security increasingly necessary. Communication to ensure 
that the public(s) is aware of the role they can play will be central to this. 
This article, based on interviews with 30 expert practitioners, explores 
challenges associated with communication designed to prevent 
radicalisation, interdict attack planning and mitigate the impacts of a terrorist 
attack in the UK and Denmark.  The interplay between these challenges and 
the contemporary terrorist context are analysed, highlighting that new, or 
adapted, communications and approaches may be necessary. 
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Introduction 
While remaining vigilant to 9/11 and 7/7 style large-scale attacks, security services 
across Europe are increasingly contending with smaller scale, less sophisticated acts 
of terrorism. Attacks by lone actors or small, self-organised cells in Belgium, the UK, 
Denmark, Germany and France testify to the growing relevance of this threat. Indeed, 
officials in countries including the UK and Germany have described future attacks of 
this nature as almost inevitable.1 The unique features and challenges of the changing 
threat landscape,2 and the active promotion of this attack style by terrorist groups such 
as Daesh and Al-Qaeda,3 present significant policy challenges. In particular, they 
make public coproduction of security increasingly necessary, by which we mean the 
active engagement of private citizens and key non-security stakeholders (e.g. 
teachers) in aiding authorities in detecting, assessing and reporting risks of violent 
extremism. Communication, already recognised as a central element of counter-
terrorism strategies, is particularly important in this context, if the public(s) are to 
recognise the role they can play and be prepared (and able) to do so.4 
 
Coproduction has informed a range of policy areas, from Neighbourhood Watch to 
public service design, across different national and cultural contexts.5 Safety and 
security are not public goods that can be produced by the state alone and simply 
consumed by citizens.6 Coproduction is therefore increasingly recognised as a vital 
component in public safely broadly and crime control and prevention specifically.7 
Whilst it is traditionally associated with expanding the role citizens play in designing 
and delivering public services,8 some scholars have explored the role that a wider 
collection of actors (e.g. private businesses) can play in coproduction – in effect 
creating a ‘responsibilized community’ to counter crime.9 
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Whilst in some contexts coproduction may arise from citizens filling in for government 
shortcomings,10 the need for public cooperation to tackle the contemporary terrorist 
risk stems from the nature of smaller, low tech attacks. The higher prevalence of social 
marginalisation, mental ill-health and online influence amongst those acting alone can 
make it harder for authorities to intervene during the radicalisation stage.11 Interdiction 
can also be especially challenging when attackers are operating alone or in small 
groups because traditional methods such as communication interception may be less 
effective.12 Finally, the trend towards this kind of attack and the focus on soft targets 
means the public need to be able to respond appropriately during an attack and return 
to normality as quickly as possible afterwards.13 
 
Consequently, UK security officials have been explicit about the need for public 
support, with senior Metropolitan Police officials identifying that the contemporary 
terrorist threat requires ‘even more public assistance’14 and suggesting that: 
 
It’s quite hard to monitor organised terrorist groups. It’s very, very 
difficult – virtually impossible – to ascertain where a lone-actor would 
strike or what’s going to provoke a lone-actor into carrying out an 
attack. So it’s absolutely crucial that the public are out there helping 
us because we couldn’t work without them.15 
 
The need for effective communication is enhanced by the fact that studies suggest the 
public feels less willing or able to contribute to safety and crime prevention compared 
to other policy areas, such as environmental improvement.16 This is problematic in 
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addressing terrorism because, as Williams et al. note, successful coproduction is 
‘dependent upon the willingness of all parties to coordinate, cooperate and 
collaborate’.17  
 
Despite the potential benefits of coproduction, there are a number of challenges 
associated with this approach, including issues related to trust and role ambiguity.18 
Similarly, there can be negative or unintended consequences specifically related to 
coproduction of security and safety, such as increasing fear of crime.19 Furthermore, 
politicians and professionals can see this approach as risky, as the behaviour of 
coproducing users is more unpredictable than that of passive users.20 Nevertheless, 
there is evidence to suggest that expanding certain types of private action can easily 
pass a cost-benefits test.21  
 
This article draws on data from 30 interviews with practitioners responsible for 
designing, commissioning or delivering counter-terrorism measures in the UK and 
Denmark.  The authors use cross-national comparisons to explore the challenges 
associated with communication designed to secure the active support of a range of 
audiences to prevent radicalisation, interdict attack planning and mitigate the impacts 
of terrorism. By drawing on an expansive body of original primary data from countries 
with distinct experiences of terrorism and approaches to counter-terrorism 
communication, this paper highlights how some existing challenges will be particularly 
important in the context of contemporary terrorism and that new, or adapted, 
communications may be necessary. Cross-national differences are highlighted where 
relevant, but our data suggest more commonalities than difference in challenges faced 
in the UK and Denmark. 
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The article aims to contribute to counter-terrorism literature and contemporary 
European policy debates in two key ways. Most importantly, the analysis of new data 
from two countries across all three phases of the counter-terrorism process 
(prevention, interdiction and mitigation) adds nuance and empirical evidence to 
support current understandings of the challenges of counter-terrorism communication. 
This is crucial considering recent research which indicates that the contemporary 
terrorist context has increased the importance of crisis communication knowledge.22 
Secondly, by looking at issues affecting communications designed to increase the 
coproduction of security across a broader range of actors than those traditionally 
focused on, the article adds to emerging coproduction literature on security and crime 
management. Overall, this research has the goal of informing and enabling a 
significant shift in existing public policy and practice towards terrorism. 
 
Methodology 
The UK and Denmark were selected for comparison as both have relatively advanced 
counter-terrorism programmes, particularly in terms of radicalisation prevention.23 
However, while some aspects are comparable cross-nationally, to date the UK has 
placed more emphasis on counter-terrorism communication directly targeting the 
general public. Furthermore, these countries have different experiences of terrorism. 
The UK has a history of both lone-actor and group-based terrorist attacks (Irish 
nationalism, the 7th July London bombings, the 2013 murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich, 
attacks on London Bridge, Manchester and Finsbury Park in 2017). Denmark has few 
historic encounters with terrorism, but has been on high-alert since the 2005 Danish 
cartoon crisis and has subsequently experienced several unsuccessful group-based 
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plots and three lone-actor attacks (two attempted, one successful). The similarities 
and differences in policies and experiences make these excellent cases for analysing 
how communication measures and their impact might depend on national counter-
terrorism discourses and experiences. 
 
A review of 197 official counter-terrorism documents designed to prevent, interdict or 
mitigate terrorism (149 documents in the UK and 48 in Denmark) were reviewed and 
used to inform interview schedules. Semi-structured interviews (N=30) were 
conducted between May and October 2015 with UK and Danish practitioners 
responsible for designing, commissioning or delivering counter-terrorism measures. 
The interviews explored issues including modes of communication delivery, 
expectations of impact, timing of communications and the media context.  Interviews 
lasted approximately one hour.  Findings were derived from thematic analysis utilising 
NVivo software. 
 
To ensure that interviews captured broad themes and context specific challenges, 
interviewees were drawn from a range of sectors, geographical locations and level of 
seniority. 22 UK practitioners were interviewed (9 from security services, 3 from central 
government, 4 from local authorities, 4 from community/faith organisations and 2 
business representatives) and 8 Danish practitioners (4 from security services and 4 
from local prevention programme providers and community outreach programmes). 
The range also reflected the ambition of understanding the impact of communication 
targeted at a range of audiences, based on an argument within coproduction studies 
that ‘the wider the range of groups sought as co-producers, the greater the potential 
benefits available’.24 The larger number of UK interviewees and documents reflects 
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the fact that the UK has gone further in its communication design and dissemination 
than Denmark and that communications are delivered by a wider variety of agencies. 
The interviews were approved by King’s College London’s Research Ethics 
Committee. 
 
UK and Danish Counter-terrorism Communication Practices and Discourses 
Both the UK and Denmark have national strategies to address terrorism. In the UK 
there is one over-arching strategy known at CONTEST, which brings together the 
efforts of a range of agencies to deliver four strands of activity: Prevent, Pursue, 
Protect and Prepare.25 In Denmark the different facets of preparing and responding 
are distinct, with separate strategies in place.26 Despite some differences in approach, 
both recognise the importance of counter-terrorism communication. However, the grey 
literature review and information provided by interviewees made clear that the UK 
deploys a larger number of communication products, has a larger scale of delivery and 
a stronger willingness for officials to speak publicly about the threat of terrorism, and 
the role that members of the public can play in mitigating this threat.27 For instance, 
the UK Security Minister outlined in March 2017 that: 
 
The horror of recent terrorist attacks in Europe and beyond is a 
shocking reminder of the threat we all face […] Our police and security 
and intelligence agencies work tirelessly, often unseen, day in and day 
out to keep families and communities across the country safe. The 
public also have a vital role to play as they are ideally placed to notice 
activity which is unusual.28 
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Both countries have developed online, printed and face-to-face communications to 
address radicalisation, designed for a range of audiences, such as frontline staff (e.g. 
social workers). However, each only has limited communication products for the more 
general population. UK authorities appear to place more emphasis on communicating 
with faith organisations and communities that may be best placed to recognise signs 
of radicalisation. For instance, the UK’s Prevent Tragedies campaign targets mothers 
of young people at risk of traveling to Syria to join Daesh.29 No large-scale counter-
terrorism interdiction or mitigation campaigns are employed in Denmark, but local level 
campaigns targeting specific vulnerable communities do exist.30 This is in contrast to 
the UK where authorities have long used interdiction campaigns such as It’s Probably 
Nothing, But… to encourage the general public to report suspicious signs of attack 
planning.31 More recently, the UK government has rolled out pre-event mitigation 
campaigns to prepare the public for actions to take in the case of a terrorist attack. 
The most important example is the Run, Hide, Tell campaign, which was originally 
delivered only to security professionals, but following coordinated attacks in Paris in 
November 2015, has been released to the general public in leaflet and video form, 
promoted in the media and tweeted by police services during the terrorist attack on 
London Bridge.32 
 
Counter-terrorism initiatives, such as the UK’s ACT campaign - which stands for Action 
Counters Terrorism, and encourages people to report suspicious activity - assume that 
members of the public can play a critical part in helping to tackle the terrorist threat.33 
ACT is intended to provide an overarching identity for terrorism-related 
communications. With the public already contributing intelligence to around one third 
of terrorism investigations, the ACT campaign recognises that members of the public 
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can play a critical part in countering terrorism.34  Similarly, a recent British Transport 
Campaign, See It, Say It, Sorted was designed to encourage train passengers and 
individuals visiting train stations to report unusual items or behaviour.35  The ACT and 
See It, Say It, Sorted campaigns  explicitly focus on coproduction, as evidenced by the 
ACT website stating ‘with the terror threat becoming increasingly complex and varied, 
police are calling on communities to act on their instincts to help prevent atrocities 
taking place in the UK and overseas’.36  Denmark does not employ this approach to 
unifying the branding of counter-terrorism messages although the importance of 
coproduction in the area of counter-terrorism is recognised in statements by security 
service officials and in policy documents.37 
 
Despite a number of communication measures having been developed in both 
countries, some threat types have no unique communications designed to address 
them specifically, such as lone actor terrorism.38 Furthermore, detailed evaluations of 
the impact of the communications are sparse in both countries, although a small 
number are now emerging in the UK.39 
 
Communication Challenges in the UK and Denmark                                                                                                                        
Analysis of interview data and grey literature enabled the authors to identify six key 
challenges that are particularly pertinent for counter-terrorism communication. Whilst 
other concerns were also raised, such as budgetary constraints and challenges 
around evaluation, these issues are common to a variety of communication areas. 
This paper, however, focuses specifically on those challenges identified as particularly 
important to counter-terrorism communications designed to secure public (and other 
actors’) support for security coproduction. These reflect the experiences of 
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practitioners over recent years and subsequently address a range of terrorist risks, but 
many of the issues raised are likely to be particularly acute for the contemporary threat 
of small-scale attacks. Some of the findings support challenges recognised in the 
wider literature, such as the perceived credibility of state messages which varies 
between countries and across different communities.40 Others have received less 
focus and provide original insight, such as activist produced counter-communications 
designed to undermine state communications intended to secure support for 
radicalisation prevention programmes. 
 
Counter-terrorism communications are dependent on the audience prioritised, the 
nature of threat (e.g. extreme far-right, Islamist or secessionist), and the wider 
government approach. As such, this article focuses on broad thematic issues, such as 
the subject of language sensitivity rather than specific terms relevant for particular 
audiences. Following consideration of these challenges, implications of our findings 
for the theory and policy of counter-terrorism communication and coproduction of 
security will be discussed. 
 
Challenge One: Engaging non-security focused partners 
Both Danish and UK respondents emphasised the importance of securing the 
cooperation of partners across the public, private and third sector but highlighted that 
this was often a challenge.  Key difficulties were believed to stem from concerns of 
potential partners, such as fears about the securitisation of their work. This appears 
particularly relevant for some public-sector front-line staff, sections of the business 
community and some community and faith groups. Securing the support of partners 
with limited security experience was considered especially challenging for 
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radicalisation prevention programmes. However, our interviews with community 
groups and intervention providers also highlighted the challenges that these potential 
partners themselves face by supporting counter-terrorism programmes and 
communication. 
 
Practitioners working on radicalisation prevention in both countries have prioritised 
communication towards public sector front-line staff, based on the assumption that 
these services engage with potentially vulnerable individuals regularly. As one UK 
security official described, ‘if you left it just to Prevent practitioners there’s not enough 
of us to do it, quite frankly’.41 Similarly, a UK local authority officer identified ‘priority 
attendees’ for training sessions as ‘people like social workers, teachers, people who 
are interfacing with already vulnerable individuals’.42  Communications targeted at 
these audiences seek to explain radicalisation prevention programmes and encourage 
specific actions, such as reporting signs of vulnerability. However, respondents 
described instances in which communication attempts resulted in push-back due to 
staff concerns over the potential targeting of certain communities, or general concerns 
over the securitisation of their work. For example, one UK local authority Prevent 
officer described how ‘people will automatically assume because it sits within 
CONTEST, it’s a securitised agenda’.43 A UK police officer identified a ‘preconceived 
idea that it was intelligence gathering with a view to executive action’.44 
 
While this challenge seems less acute in Denmark, Danish practitioners nevertheless 
reported that the authorities underestimated the communication task involved in 
convincing frontline personnel that radicalisation prevention is similar to other 
safeguarding issues.45 Thus, messages at awareness workshops were initially 
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received with scepticism, especially by teachers who did not see it as ‘their job to spot 
potential terrorists’.46 However, push-back is more organised in the UK, where the 
Prevent Strategy has been publically criticised by The National Students Union,47 
medical professionals48 and delegates from the National Union of Teachers.49 
 
Securing community and faith group support has been similarly challenging for 
government and security practitioners. Whilst not a priority for Denmark, in the UK 
there have been efforts to work with individuals and groups perceived to have 
credibility in the eyes of the audiences believed to be vulnerable to radicalisation (e.g. 
for delivering counter-narrative communications or publicly supporting radicalisation 
prevention programmes). Some interviewees highlighted difficulties in securing this 
support, attributing this to scepticism amongst some community and faith 
organisations about counter-terrorism strategies.50 The fear of being seen to work too 
closely with the state and losing credibility with local communities was also raised in 
these interviews. As one UK police officer outlined, ‘if you’re seen to be working hand 
in glove with the state, there are risks attached to that’.51 Other UK interviewees 
focused on practical issues which make community group delivery of counter-
radicalisation communication difficult, suggesting that, ‘when you look at Imams and 
the Muslim community with regards to the community networks, their IT footprint on 
the internet is absolutely minimal’.52 Consequently, some local authority Prevent 
officers argued that there are a lack of ‘credible community voices’ to deliver counter-
narrative work. 
 
In the interdiction and mitigation spaces practitioners highlighted a lack of support from 
some businesses. Once again, this concern was more acute in the UK (in large part 
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because the UK has far more communications targeted at this audience). Despite an 
increased recognition by many businesses about the threat of terrorism, some are 
reportedly reluctant to share government counter-terrorism communications with staff 
and customers.53  Interviewees indicated that this stems from at least three sources. 
The first is concern that counter-terrorism messages undermine the organisation’s 
brand. A business consultant advising clients on security recalled that: 
 
One type of organisation, and it is a kind of high-end luxury goods 
organisation, and they’re very brand conscious […] they will not put signs 
up around the walls, so for them it’s the challenge, they want the effect, 
but they won’t put signs up on the walls.54 
 
Reflecting on her experiences working with other high-end clients, she suggested that: 
 
In terms of slotting in any kind of message from the government, it just 
doesn’t happen, so you wouldn’t see even in a lift for a company where it’s 
got scrolling news, unless they felt it was specific to their organisation […] 
It’s just considered to be too war-like for them.55 
 
The second factor was concern that promoting counter-terrorism messages creates 
the appearance that the organisation is a target, which could subsequently deter 
customers. A security manager at a high profile sporting venue emphasised that the 
club is reliant on its fan base and, consequently, public perceptions of the organisation 
are important. While being clear that requests from police would be adhered to the 
club is nevertheless conscious of avoiding messaging that makes fans think, ‘Oh, I’m 
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not going to [name of sports club removed], they’re worried to death about a bomb 
going off there’.56 This concern is more commonly reported by businesses in the UK 
in comparison to concerns raised by Danish interviewees. 
 
The final barrier was that some businesses either do not see a terrorist attack as a 
realistic threat or feel that they could not have an impact if an attack occurred, an issue 
raised by practitioners in both countries.57 For instance, a manual for trainers in 
Denmark suggests that for store managers: 
 
Terrorism is so far not an element in their risk assessment, especially 
because they experience that they cannot make a difference in case of a 
terrorist attack. In light of that it is easier to ignore the risk.58 
 
This perception stems in part from the security services being limited in what 
information they can share. One UK police officer reported that businesses complain 
about a lack of evidence behind security recommendations. This is because he can 
only share what is approved and provided by the UK intelligence service’s Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre59. Another interviewee suggested that changing business 
attitudes is difficult because obtaining focused and current threat information ‘is almost 
impossible’.60 Furthermore, a Danish security service interviewee underlined, based 
on a target group assessment carried out with Danish store managers in crowded 
places, that the risk from terrorism is generally perceived to be ‘less important than 
being service-minded amongst overworked, young and politically disinterested shop 
keepers’.61 
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Challenge Two: Credibility and branding 
A related challenge to the effective delivery of counter-terrorism communication is the 
credibility and branding of communications, particularly for radicalisation prevention. 
Some respondents highlighted a conflicted view concerning the scale of this challenge, 
especially in the UK. Some UK practitioners were confident that prevention messages 
were well received by communities. One suggested that, ‘it’s warmly welcome, yeah I 
do think, I think they take it on board, I think they like the fact that we’re talking to 
them’62 whilst one police officer suggested that ‘there’s very little resistance […] I’ve 
stood up in front of Mosque congregations and given talks, they’re usually very 
appreciative’.63 
 
However, many suggested that state messages about radicalisation are often not 
perceived as credible. One UK police officer argued that for many communities, 
including but not limited to Muslim communities, police counter-terrorist 
communications are treated with ‘suspicion’ and suggested that ‘the police are the last 
person that are a credible source to some people and sections of the community’.64 
Another suggested that if ‘you badge that counter-narrative with Home Office or a 
police badge, no one’s ever going to look at it’.65 A different police officer argued that 
‘products out there that had a government and or police footprint on them in any way, 
they’d have no credibility with the people that we’re trying to get to’.66 Similarly, a UK 
local authority Prevent lead suggested that ‘when there’s a government footprint on it 
[a communication campaign], it doesn’t gain traction locally’67 whilst another Prevent 
officer argued that, ‘people just don’t believe the government’.68 In terms of counter-
narratives, one central government official suggested that for many of the audiences 
that Prevent messages try to reach ‘government isn’t the most credible voice’.69 
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Danish interviewees also noted these challenges, commenting on low levels of trust 
in the government and police amongst target audiences, although there appeared 
fewer conflicting opinions about community perceptions of government 
communications. One Danish interviewee suggested that workshop instructors and 
community outreach coordinators are perceived as representatives of the system 
which some target groups distrust, thus making communicating about radicalisation 
difficult.70 Another suggested that: 
 
At times wearing ‘blue shirts’ and stressing that you come from the police is 
a great advantage. With some target groups this gives credibility and power 
to the message. It simply means more respect, which is conducive to getting 
the message across. In other situations our police background serves as a 
conversation blocker.71 
 
Similarly, a Danish workshop instructor reported that students often feel more at ease 
if instructors explain that they represent the municipality and not the police.72 
Interviewees in both states suggested that this challenge can be overcome by clearly 
stating objectives and being approachable but underlined that building mutual trust 
takes time. One Danish counter-radicalisation mentor argued that: 
 
Dismantling the initial layers of distrust in me as a representative of the 
system sometimes takes months. Sometimes I never succeed. But it can be 
done by investing some of yourself and explaining clearly that you are here 
to help and not to judge them.73 
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Representatives of UK community and faith organisations supported these insights. 
Despite noting that they welcomed face-to-face engagement they suggested that 
formal communication modes were often received less positively. One community 
organisation suggested that the Government’s ‘political style communications’ often 
fail to relate with the Muslim communities or vulnerable individuals – in part because 
they signal to a community that they are being singled out or because they lack 
understanding of the cultures within those communities.74 Another organisation 
working with Muslim women reflected on a police communication campaign 
encouraging mothers to report fears that family members were becoming radicalised. 
She suggested that local mothers were ‘up in arms’ and that deep-lying mistrust of the 
police could not be overcome with this type of campaign as ‘the police are the last 
people they would go to’.75 An intervention provider with expertise in far-right 
communities reinforced this point, arguing that: 
 
Politicians and even police, they’re seen by these guys as the system. They 
don’t listen to people like that, they don’t, that’s a fact, that’s like asking an 
Islamist to listen to, I don’t know… David Cameron, Tony Blair.76 
 
While organised and influential opposition to radicalisation prevention programmes 
seem low scale or absent in Denmark, in the UK context credibility is further 
undermined by the influence of domestic organisations opposed to the Prevent 
Strategy. For instance, several interviewees mentioned the advocacy group CAGE, 
which is frequently critical of the Prevent Strategy. One local authority officer 
suggested that: 
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CAGE will print a 30-page bad news story on Prevent and, actually, when you 
meet people – particularly in the Muslim community – and you talk Prevent, 
the first thing they’ll say, they’ll start quoting you from CAGE […] They’re 
much more interesting to listen to; they’re much more emotive than 
government speech, and emotive language is really important.77 
 
Another, from a different borough, described similar experiences: 
 
I think they [CAGE] have a very effective communication and media strategy 
and they reach out to the masses really, and I think that’s why they have so 
much buy-in from the Muslim community […] the local communities are just 
literally copying and pasting bits and pieces off their website and that’s their 
counter-narrative.78 
 
One central government official referred to: 
 
An anti-anti-extremism lobby, which is pretty well organised, apparently 
reasonably well funded and has been at it for a long time, and we do see what 
we would probably argue are quite extreme positions echoed in what should 
be mainstream BME media outlets, aimed at sections of the community, 
because they have become normalised through lack of challenge in the 
past.79 
 
Challenge Three: Unintended consequences 
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The difficulty of avoiding unintended negative consequences was also raised – a 
prominent concern in both countries. Several practitioners involved in radicalisation 
communications noted the potential to cause fear or reinforce perceptions of 
stigmatisation.80 As one UK central government official noted, ‘a key challenge is 
always not do more harm than good’.81 Summarising the risks of radicalisation 
communications if not carefully managed, a Danish local authority interviewee 
suggested that: 
 
There is a lot of mistrust in the beginning. ‘Why do you contact me, and not 
him?’ ‘What is your real agenda?’ ‘Why do you always treat Jews and 
Muslims differently?’ Such preconceptions and perceptions cloud 
communication and create misunderstandings.82 
 
However, the largest potential unintended consequences were raised in the context of 
interdiction and mitigation where concern was expressed that communication could 
scare the public, create message fatigue or promote over-reactions that could 
potentially overburden responding services with false alerts. One UK interviewee 
referred to examples of members of the public being needlessly afraid of Muslim 
individuals wearing rucksacks on the tube following 7/7.83 Concern about provoking 
fear was also noted by Danish practitioners, with one suggesting: 
 
This is communication on a knife’s edge. It is a delicate balance between 
transmitting important messages and scaring people. Communicating about 
terrorism in public is tricky in terms of not saying anything wrong or saying 
Copyright: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism  ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
20 
 
something that can be misunderstood. Really, communication is everything 
here.84 
 
Some UK officials were particularly concerned that pre-event mitigation 
communication could scare the public. Indeed, one police officer suggested that 
transport police handing out Run, Hide, Tell leaflets during Counter-Terrorism 
Week in 2014 ‘basically sent the fear of God into people who were on the London 
transport network’.85 However, this may be a reflection of the perception of public 
panic rather than evidenced fear, with other interviewees suggesting that it had 
little impact. As such the objective of not causing harm can make practitioners 
reluctant to address important topics. As one UK local authority interviewee 
suggested, ‘as a state we are scared of surfacing latent conflict, and agencies are, 
and we do not speak of such things for fear that we will make it worse’.86 While this 
reluctance is being overcome to a degree in the UK, in Denmark there are few 
large-scale interdiction or mitigation communication campaigns exactly because of 
‘fears of feeding over-reactions’.87 
 
Challenge Four: Content and Timing of Communications 
Communicative content and the speed at which information can be disseminated 
make up the fourth challenge that is relevant at all three counter-terrorism stages. For 
instance, prevention messages conveying how to recognise signs of vulnerability are 
complex, as are many of the counter-narratives practitioners seek to promote. 
Interviewees in both countries also mentioned the difficulties in ensuring message 
consistency because of the complexity of the communication or due to staff only 
receiving basic training. A Danish local authority officer suggested that if radicalisation 
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prevention measures are expanded too fast miscommunication is likely.88 Similarly, 
members of a Danish local radicalisation prevention unit expressed concern about 
recruiting new workshop instructors as demand has risen. This led to the development 
of a ‘workshop manual’ for less experienced workshop instructors, which conveys ‘dos 
and don’ts’ of communicating with different audiences. A UK practitioner provided an 
example of how inexperienced or contracted staff can make errors: 
 
We went down the line of employing specialist agencies in communications, 
which was equally as flawed, because they just didn’t understand the 
nuances of the language and you use one word out of place and all of a 
sudden you’re not sending counter-narrative, you’re actually undermining a 
key element of the Muslim faith.89 
 
The timing of content delivery is also a challenge – partly because of the difficulty in 
keeping pace with terrorist propaganda. There was a perception amongst some 
interviewees that terrorist communications are speedier than government messaging 
and disseminated in larger bulk. This concern seemed to be more pressing in the UK. 
One UK community organisation argued that government communications are 
“dwarfed” by the communications of terrorist groups.90 A UK police officer suggested 
that: 
 
ISIL have got a really sophisticated communication platform, and they’re 
very clever at mixing everyday life with acts of terrorism […] we have 
budgetary constraints that these organisations don’t have, and they are 
able to pump that out and our response to that, again, needs to be 
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regulated, needs to be checked, we need to look at guidelines, policy, 
what message do we want to send out there? By the time we’ve checked 
all that and formulated an appropriate response, there might have been 
500 tweets gone out.91 
 
Another officer outlined that Daesh are: 
 
Pretty good at comms, we’re dealing with people that have been through 
university and they’ve done social media and they are pretty slick. You 
look at some of the videos coming out of Syria and they are very, very 
impactive.92 
 
For interdiction communication the primary challenge in relation to content is to explain 
what ‘suspicious’ behaviour looks like. One local Danish prevention provider stressed 
how they were often ‘met with a demand for a list of concrete signs of suspicious 
behaviour to report’ from non-security focused partners.93  Many documents in the 
grey literature attempt to do this and there is a wide body of advice in both countries, 
including for a range of industries. Nevertheless, in the context of small scale terrorist 
attack planning challenges remain. One UK interviewee reflected that when 
communicating about the IRA it could be quite obvious what signs to look out for, such 
as someone buying a car with cash and without documentation, but that with lone-
actors it is more difficult: 
 
There was a lot of indicators there, and especially up in the bomb factories in 
Leeds, to say if we’d got the messages right somebody might’ve rung up […] 
Copyright: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism  ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
23 
 
Very difficult for an individual who’s radicalised on his computer in his back 
room, who goes into his kitchen, picks up a knife and goes out and stabs 
somebody. What can you say to the general public about that?94 
 
A further issue concerns accuracy. This is applicable for all three stages but is often 
especially problematic for mitigation messages due to the need to communicate 
quickly after an incident. Communicating quickly after an event can be important for a 
range of reasons, including providing advice, reducing fear and maintaining public trust 
in the authorities.95 Several challenges are associated with swift and accurate delivery 
of communications. As a Cabinet Office report highlights: 
 
The key to effective communication with the public is getting the message 
right for the right audience, balancing the need to rapidly disseminate 
information with the methods available at the time of the emergency. How 
information and advice are delivered can greatly affect how they are 
received.96 
 
A UK security services official also reflected on the importance of rapid 
communications: 
 
One of the things that we learnt most recently is as an incident is breaking 
and is still on-going, is to communicate quickly at the time, regular short 
communication is a good thing which the public appreciate, although you 
can’t tell them what’s going on because you may not know what’s going 
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on, but you can say to them that there’s things are just what we are 
working on.97 
 
However, the lack of accurate information in the immediate aftermath often means 
authorities may be forced to disseminate partial information. 
 
Challenge Five: Partnership working 
The challenges of partnership working are pertinent to a range of policy issues,98 but 
appear particularly relevant for counter-terrorism communication and are related to the 
challenges of timely communications outlined above. Interviewees explained this 
challenge in terms of the scale of counter-terrorism activity, the number of agencies 
involved, the complex and fast-paced nature of the work, a lack of clarity about 
respective responsibilities, legal complexities around information sharing and 
contrasting organisational cultures. The majority of interviewees in both countries felt 
that core statutory partners were committed to a shared agenda, providing many 
examples of effective partnership working. However, coordination is reportedly often 
a challenge, which can result in fragmented or inconsistent communications. 
 
One important reason for this was the number of agencies delivering the same 
agenda. This is particularly so in the UK where more agencies deliver counter-
terrorism communications. For instance, a local authority Prevent officer suggested 
that: 
 
The funny thing about Prevent is there are different people delivering 
Prevent. So you’ve got local authorities, you’ve got the police, NHS and 
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other people and we may randomly do the same things but at different times. 
So the police might do something on the internet and then we’ll do 
something on the internet. Sometimes there is a bit of a non-marrying up of 
timelines.99 
 
Another UK interviewee described a central government letter sent to local authority 
Children’s’ Services Directors advertising a hotline for concerns about young people 
traveling to Syria. According to the interviewee, some Children’s Services teams were 
initially confused by this as they already had established reporting pathways via local 
authority Prevent leads.100 Regarding mitigation, the Run, Hide, Tell campaign was 
released publicly during Counter-Terrorism Week by British Transport Police. 
According to one senior officer the campaign was initially meant to be part of the wider 
Project Griffin training for security professionals only. However, reportedly: 
 
Some forces took it in their own remit to hand them out to Joe public 
coming off the train. It was never made to be delivered to a member of 
the public who hadn’t been through the full security briefing […] it 
shouldn’t just be getting handed to someone without an explanation.101 
 
The officer felt that ultimately no adverse impact resulted from this release, but 
suggested that it nevertheless represented ‘a little bit of a breakdown in 
communication’.102 
 
Communications can also be delayed or fragmented because of the number of 
partners involved. As one UK police interviewee described: 
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So if we have an issue, we take it away, gather our partners, bring the 
Home Office in and then we come to some consensus of views as to 
what we should say, well you’ve burned three weeks and the public 
locally don’t care anymore.103 
 
Another senior UK security official suggested that ‘the most significant challenge is 
actually around the number of stakeholders that are connected’ to the messaging. He 
provided an example of a planned attack on the London Stock Exchange, where the 
nature of the attack and location of the plotters and target meant that five different 
policing bodies were involved alongside the Crown Prosecution Service and MI5. He 
reflected that this meant: 
 
 We’ve got seven fairly tricky, big stakeholders to manage over simple 
messaging and quite often very tight timeframes over how quickly you 
respond, and particularly for things like social media stuff now, then you 
have to have much, much faster time decision making to respond to that 
social media pressure. So that’s, I think, the biggest challenge to CT 
policing.104 
 
Sharing of sensitive information was another key challenge raised. Although raised by 
practitioners in both states it was highlighted as a bigger factor by Danish interviewees. 
In Denmark, one city’s relative success in prevention was attributed to the use of a 
cross-disciplinary task force, involving the Department of Youth, Department of Social 
Affairs, local police and schools, Social Affairs and Police consultants based at 
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schools.105 However, the legal design of collaboration, such as information sharing, as 
well as organisational factors, including administrative backing and funding, was a 
challenge from the outset. This issue reportedly exists in other municipalities. 
 
Cultural barriers were also cited as a challenge to partnership working. Danish 
interviewees and handbooks on radicalisation prevention pointed to how stakeholders 
approach cases of radicalisation with different perspectives.106 The teacher focuses 
on the students’ general well-being at school, the social worker cares about the family 
situation whilst the policeman is concerned with illegal activity.107 Agreeing on what 
should be done, and what the end-goal is can therefore be difficult.108 UK officials 
reported similar experiences. One security services official reflected on meetings with 
the NHS, and his frustration with their seemingly slow pace of implementation. He later 
accepted that their concerns that a fast implementation of radicalisation training for 
staff would have caused backlash were legitimate and that, ‘the policing approach of 
we charge in and we do it and make things happen was never going to work in the 
NHS’, ultimately concluding that the NHS became one of their best partners for internal 
communication.109 
 
Such issues may stem in part from lack of common communication principles or joint 
plans. For instance, one local authority Prevent officer suggested that the limits of local 
communications are a consequence of the lack of an over-arching communication 
strategy, suggesting that: 
 
One of the other areas that we need to really explore and strengthen is 
just having a clear communication strategy because at the moment it is 
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all a bit ad hoc. The reason we don’t have a local strategy is because 
there’s no national strategy to drive that, so it’s all a bit patchy.110 
 
Challenge Six: Media 
The final challenge identified was the potential for the media to undermine counter-
terrorism communications. Many interviewees recognised the importance of the media 
in helping to disseminate messages and provided examples of positive interactions. 
One UK security official, for example, felt that Prevent Tragedies had been positively 
picked up by the media,111 whilst a UK local authority officer described using the media 
to help promote Not in My Name, which challenged Daesh’s assertion to represent 
Muslims.112 Others spoke of developing good relations with the press, with one 
security official suggesting that, ‘for us to get stories into the media, I don’t think it’s 
that difficult’113 and another highlighting that the media is helpful in disseminating 
requests for public information that could disrupt a planned attack.114 Danish 
practitioners emphasised that radicalisation events or terrorist attacks are important 
opportunities to use the press to engage with the wider public. For instance, intense 
media interest following the February 2015 Copenhagen terrorist attacks allowed 
practitioners to explain counter-terrorism approaches and successes.115 
 
Despite this, several interviewees in both countries suggested that the media made 
their work more difficult in two regards. Firstly, sections of the press were considered 
to focus on extremist voices from Muslim communities rather than the majority who 
condemn terrorism. There was concern that this contributes to the myth that extremist 
individuals represent the Muslim community, which can cause social harm. This 
Copyright: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism  ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
29 
 
includes feeding the narrative of right-wing groups and perpetuating ‘us and them’ 
divisions.116 One UK faith organisation suggested that: 
 
Overwhelmingly [the press] allow these side-line characters who preach 
division and talk about things like making England a Muslim state and all that, 
they give them too much time on television over the last few years and it’s 
sensationalism and it promotes negative stereotypes.117 
 
Another interviewee from the UK security services described meetings with Muslim 
leaders who voiced concerns that such stories undermined community cohesion and 
the work they were doing.118 Similarly, a UK police officer suggested that: 
 
The more positive messaging tends not to get the publicity. There are certain 
papers that thrive on the paedophile element, the beheading […] I come back 
to Muslim individuals, community groups’ efforts that will never reach the 
media. At the same events that they’re holding to counteract terrorism and 
there have been Muslim communities that have actually held their own 
conferences, the media’s not interested, but the next day they’ll be saying, 
‘Why do Muslims never stand up and oppose, why are they not opposing 
IS?’119 
 
Similarly, a Danish security service officer involved in community outreach said: 
 
 We have experienced how carefully crafted relations and trust have been 
undermined or challenged by negative media stories that do not clearly state 
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who are the source of criticism about e.g. a particular Muslim community. 
Feeling exposed communities may retract from collaboration even though 
we try to explain to them that we are not behind such stories.120 
 
Secondly, several interviewees criticised sections of the media for Islamophobia and 
suggested that this alienates some Muslims from mainstream society, potentially 
making some more vulnerable to extremist narratives. One UK local authority 
suggested that, ‘there are high levels of Islamophobia in society. Particularly in the 
media – I think that’s apparent’.121 A UK police officer focused on the impact of this, 
suggesting that for young Muslims: 
 
The biggest grievance they have is against the media […] if a young person’s 
already feeling that they don’t belong in the West… they’re not integrated or 
they don’t belong in their community and then they see on the tele[vision] 
constantly the media showing Muslims in a bad light, then that definitely is a 
big factor and I can see that being a hook for people with extreme ideologies 
to then go on to radicalise young people.122 
 
Similarly, some Danish practitioners suggested that the tabloid media ‘demonize’ 
certain Islamic milieus and mosques in ways that make communication about such 
settings difficult. Several interviewees involved in counter-radicalisation efforts found 
it important in their communications to impose a more balanced view and to counter 
‘media stereotypes’ of Islam.123 
 
Discussion: Implications for improving counter-terrorism communication 
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This study confirms and extends insights from the counter-terrorism and coproduction 
literature, and indicates that existing counter-terrorism communications may need to 
be adapted to address the contemporary terrorist threat. The data not only identifies 
challenges, but points to some ways in which these challenges can be addressed.  
 
Literature confirmation and extension 
This paper contributes to six key arguments in the counter-terrorism and coproduction 
literature. Firstly, it demonstrates that practitioner perceptions are aligned with 
research suggesting that the contemporary trend of small-scale terrorism committed 
by lone-actors or small, self-organised cells, whilst not a new phenomenon,124 is a 
growing and uniquely difficult threat for European states to counter or address.125 
Although attack planning makes the actor(s) somewhat vulnerable to detection, 
interviewees mirrored research outlining that such attacks are more challenging to 
prevent and interdict than larger, organised group attacks.126 Some interviewees 
attributed this to difficulty in identifying potential attackers because of social isolation 
and online radicalisation, which corresponds with insights from the field.127 Others 
focused on the challenges of interdicting small, low tech attacks. Referring to specific 
locations and possible targets some interviewees suggested that potential lone-actors 
would be ‘very unfortunate to be detected’ or that if an attacker was well prepared 
‘there’s very little that could be done to prevent that from happening.128 Such findings 
build on previous comments from senior security professionals and research which 
focuses on the difficulties of detecting lone actor and small-scale plots.129  
 
Secondly, the data (particularly from the UK) supports the literature in locating counter-
terrorism communication as a crucial aspect of overall strategy.130 According to one 
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UK security services officer, ‘communication with the public has never been more 
important […] you’re only going to deal with those issues [radicalisation] through 
effective communication with the public’.131 Another suggested that communication is: 
 
A really important part of each of the stages [prevent, interdiction and 
mitigation], we underestimate at our peril […] you can have stuff which is 
technically brilliant in terms of the rest of the policing package. If you get the 
communications wrong, or the relationship management side of it wrong, then 
you can turn what was a success into a bit of a fail pretty quickly.132 
 
A central government official suggested that, ‘strategic communications has a very 
tangible real-world effect […] it’s a very important part of the toolkit’.133 
 
Thirdly, and closely linked to the previous point, is that coproduction is necessary for 
the management of contemporary terrorist threats to Europe, whether that be Islamist, 
extreme far-right or another form, which will in part be secured through effective 
communication. The data highlighted the need for active public support to counter 
terrorism. Such views reinforce and expand on coproduction literature exploring the 
importance of the public in crime prevention and management and support previous 
statements by senior practitioners that focus on the role of public contributions.134 
 
Fourthly, the data went some way beyond existing research concerning the need to 
enlist the support of non-security focused front-line professionals to recognise 
vulnerabilities to radicalisation - subsequently making them important audiences for 
counter-terrorism communications designed to enhance coproduction.135 Interviewees 
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also outlined specific communicative strategies for securing support, such as framing 
preventative work within a safeguarding lexicon. A UK local authority officer suggested 
that when communications were framed in these terms ‘you’d really see that light bulb 
moment, in front-line practitioners, social workers who’ve worked in social services for 
30 years, just waking up to the fact that actually, “Yes”’.136 Similarly, a UK police officer 
suggested that: 
 
When we used to go and talk to the Youth Offending Service, the 
police weren’t very well liked within the Youth Offending Service. So 
when we were able to set it in that safeguarding context, people 
actually got what we were doing.137 
 
This finding indicates the potential for coproduction studies to look beyond traditional 
units of analysis.  Counter-terrorism communication should focus on a broad range of 
audiences and consider professional lexicons and framings to enhance buy-in from 
specific audiences. As one Danish security service officer put it: ‘The key is to embed 
the message in the discourse of the target group’.138 
 
Fifthly, the data reinforced research arguing that counter-terrorism communication (like 
other disaster communication), can have unintended negative consequences.139 The 
two primary issues raised were that preventative communications, such as counter-
narratives, could stigmatise communities or make them feel targeted, and that 
interdiction or pre-event mitigation communications could increase public fear about 
terrorism. The academic debates about the positive and negative impacts of counter-
terror communication were clearly reflected in the practitioner interviews, where 
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opinions were divided. Many practitioners considered counter-narratives an essential 
component of counter-terrorism work, whilst others highlighted the potential for 
negative consequences, as has been raised in previous research.140 Similarly, whilst 
some practitioners were concerned about causing public panic, others felt that pre-
event mitigation campaigns did not cause social harm and urged authorities to be 
bolder in their communications to prepare the public. This aligns with literature 
suggesting that the propensity of the public to ‘panic’ has been overstated.141 Both the 
extent to which counter-terrorism communication can alarm the public and the impact 
of counter-narratives appear to be areas where further research is required. 
 
Finally, security professionals and community and faith sector interviewees were 
aligned with literature suggesting that Daesh propaganda is effective and that 
government communications, at times, do not keep pace and are a counter-terrorism 
weakness.142 This article extends understandings of this challenge by incorporating a 
domestic element, whereby local actors’ undermined communications designed to 
counter extremist and terrorist propaganda by seeking to challenge local preventative 
strategies. 
 
Policy Considerations 
The data, combined with insights from the literature, suggest that the adaptation and 
scale of existing counter-terrorism communications to respond to the threat of small-
scale, low tech attacks by fostering the coproduction of security with a broad range of 
actors is necessary. This is especially relevant in light of the fact that the authors could 
identify only a small number of documents designed specifically to address lone-actor 
or small-scale terrorism in the UK and Denmark. As UK counter-terrorism practitioners 
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noted, ‘we do not really have any tools that talk about lone-actors’,143 ‘there’s nothing 
that I can think of that’s gone out to communities specifically on lone-actors’,144 and ‘in 
terms of one-to-one communication, trying to target those potential lone-actors and all 
those sorts of things, then I would probably suggest we don’t have a sophisticated 
plan’.145 
 
Of course, some existing communications include content that is relevant to small-
scale terrorism. For instance, the UK National Counter Terrorism Security Office’s 
Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Hotels and Restaurants includes 
information about protective measures to take against suicide bombers. In Denmark, 
some broader communications (primarily training packages) include aspects such as 
a lone shooter scenario as part of a wider interdiction workshop for businesses. 
Nevertheless, the limited content is surprising considering recent studies argue that 
the characteristics of lone-attackers indicate that specific counter measures, including 
communications, are necessary.146 Countries without communication interventions 
specifically targeted towards lone-actor or small group attacks are potentially lacking 
a crucial element to address terrorist threats. Similarly, the difficulties of detecting such 
attacks suggests that communication to secure coproduction for interdiction and 
mitigation may be necessary in Denmark and other European countries that currently 
do not communicate on a large scale. 
 
Interviewee concerns about inconsistent communication and lack of coordination 
indicate that new communication measures should fit within over-arching 
communication plans and be supported with guidance or handbooks for practitioners. 
The specificities of new communications will need detailed consideration as, to date, 
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there has been little empirical analysis that could guide the design and implementation 
of communication measures for low tech, small-scale terrorism.147 However, our 
research has identified broad policy options for practitioners to consider as 
approaches for improving communication aimed at preventing, interdicting and 
mitigating terrorism through security coproduction. 
 
Preventing radicalisation 
The difficulties of interdicting low sophistication, small-scale attacks, and the lack of 
research for mitigating this type of attack, suggest that the prevention stage could take 
on increased significance. Analysis of interview data alongside radicalisation literature 
indicates that practitioners planning communication to prevent radicalisation should 
consider three specific issues to enhance coproduction.148 The first is the mode of 
communication delivery designed to secure the support of people most likely to come 
into contact with vulnerable individuals. This paper has outlined the limits of existing 
communications because of issues such as limited perceived credibility. Practitioners 
and community representatives were clear that face-to-face communication was an 
important way to overcome this so that questions could be answered and trust 
developed. For instance, one UK local authority interviewee described a long-standing 
community advisory group that enabled monthly meetings between Prevent 
practitioners and key community representatives from faith and community 
organisations. This has reportedly been successful in creating a safe space for open 
discussions, to share information and understand what extremist narratives have 
traction locally which can then be challenged in larger forums.149 Such policies could 
require significant resources, but practitioners in both countries were clear that this 
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was the most effective way to secure support for radicalisation prevention 
programmes. 
 
Secondly, there may be a need to diversify the range of individuals receiving training 
on how to recognise and report signs of radicalisation. Bouhana et al. note that, ‘little 
if any specificity is known about the nature of the places where lone-actor radicalisation 
happens’.150 As such, ensuring that a broad and appropriate collection of people are 
trained to recognise vulnerabilities is essential.151 Finite resources mean that some 
audiences will need to be prioritised based on the features of potential lone-actor or 
small group terrorism. For instance, lone-actors are considered more likely to suffer 
from mental ill-health and psychological disorders, be older than group-based terrorists 
and more likely to be unemployed.152 In addition to focusing training to school teachers 
or social workers, training targeted towards mental health professionals or housing 
officers – individuals more likely to deal with individuals that have common lone-actor 
traits – may become more important. Additionally, communication to increase the wider 
public’s understanding of, and trust in, radicalisation prevention programmes is likely 
to be important because of leakage (the intentional or unintentional communication to 
a third party of an intent to do harm to a target).153 This a common behaviour exhibited 
by terrorists acting alone or not directed by a larger group and as such public reporting 
of this behaviour could be an essential form of coproduction.154 
 
Finally, overcoming the challenge of working with community/faith sector and business 
voices perceived to be credible to targeted audiences and securing their support in 
delivering communications to targeted groups in society is important. Credible counter 
(or alternative) narratives are potentially of heightened importance because of recent 
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high-profile propaganda efforts by terrorist groups that encourage attacks in Europe.155 
Despite the limits and risks of preventative communications, including counter-
narratives, the data is clear that those that are most effective will be delivered from 
community leaders, with the role of government limited to enabler where required.156 
The findings in this paper indicate that whilst the primary challenge is securing the 
support of credible voices, the issue of reach and timing will also need to be addressed 
given the reported limits of the online presence of many groups. This is problematic 
considering findings which suggest that the internet often plays a prominent role within 
radicalisation.157 Investment in the capacity of credible community organisations to 
deliver messages, such as website construction and social media training, may thus 
be necessary. 
 
Interdiction 
This section sets out three issues for policy-makers to consider regarding interdiction 
communication. Firstly, as noted, one of the main differences between UK and Danish 
counter-terrorism communication is the lack of large-scale public campaigns in 
Denmark because of concerns about scaring the public. However, the difficulties of 
applying traditional interdiction methods to lone-actors or small groups, (e.g. their more 
common levels of social marginalisation and increased promotion of this sort of attack 
by terrorist groups) means that public support in recognising and reporting suspicious 
signs will be crucial. As such public campaigns may need to be a more central feature 
of communications across Europe – particularly given the high levels of leakage 
associated with such attacks.158 
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Secondly, securing the support of a wider spectrum of businesses to communicate with 
their staff and customers takes on added importance in light of features particular to 
low sophistication, small scale attacks, including selection and surveillance of targets 
and weapon selection.159 With analysts having highlighted the near impossibility of 
target-hardening soft civilian targets, support for developing a vigilance culture 
becomes increasingly important.160 Whilst interdiction of low sophistication attacks can 
be more difficult, it is nevertheless the case that reconnaissance remains a vulnerability 
for prospective attackers, with the potential for detection and disruption at its highest.161 
Securing support of businesses is likely to require more detailed briefings to emphasise 
the risk of attacks. A security consultant who advises large firms suggested that 
currently many businesses consider the likelihood of lone-actor attacks as ‘incredibly 
slim’, suggesting that ‘they don’t know enough’ and that some businesses consider 
government counter-terrorism campaigns as ‘over-kill’.162 
 
Finally, closer cooperation with the media could increase reporting of leakage. One 
study suggests that in 58.8% of lone-actor cases offenders produced letters or public 
statements outlining their beliefs. Alongside self-printed leaflets and statements in 
virtual forums, these statements included letters to newspapers.163 As such Gill’s 
suggestion that media outlets who receive letters advocating extremist propaganda 
and agendas may play a key role in detecting and disrupting attacks seems highly 
relevant.164 
 
Mitigation 
The difficulties of interdiction and increasing prevalence of small-scale attacks means 
that preparing the public in advance about protective behaviours could be increasingly 
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important. For example, stopping to record an attack on mobile phones, as happened 
during incidents in Woolwich and Leytonstone, may put the public at more risk. The 
UK has begun such communications through its Run, Hide, Tell campaign but no such 
large scale campaigns exist in Denmark. 
 
A second issue centres on content designed to mitigate the social impact (e.g. fear) of 
low sophistication attacks.165 The murder of Lee Rigby in 2013 highlighted the impact 
small scale, low sophistication attacks can have on the public and that unique 
mitigation could be required to reassure the public and manage community tensions. 
Existing research on effective communication for mitigating terrorist attacks tends to 
focus on more sophisticated attacks, such as chemical, biological, radiological or 
nuclear (CBRN) terrorism.166 There has been little research on how to mitigate, for 
instance, run-over attacks from a communication perspective and it is less clear how 
the public might respond, although information is becoming clearer in light of recent 
attacks. Compared to other parts of the world, Europe is also relatively inexperienced 
in dealing with shooters. As such, mitigation communication may need to be enhanced 
or adapted and draw on the experiences of non-European states. Policies to address 
social cohesion must include more pro-active reassurance from government and 
community actors, as well as closer work with the media to temper some reporting. 
 
Finally, whilst research on the area is limited, both researchers and practitioners 
indicate the potential for copycat attacks. This suggests a need for credible and rapid 
condemnation of attacks to deter potential attackers who may be inspired by what they 
have seen.167 Pantucci argues that the a series of attacks in Germany in July 2016 
may have been ‘accelerated’ by earlier attacks,168 whilst investigators suggested that 
Copyright: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism  ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
41 
 
knife attacks in consecutive days in France in December 2014 had a ‘copycat 
connection’.169 One study of lone-actor terrorism found that 26.9% of lone-actors had 
read literature or propaganda concerning other lone-actors.170 This makes the 
challenge of securing the support of credible community and faith partners increasingly 
critical. 
 
Conclusion 
Small-scale, low sophistication terrorist attacks are an increasingly important security 
concern for many European states. Their unique features require the support of the 
public and other actors to contribute to the coproduction of security, in terms of 
preventing, interdicting and mitigating these attacks. Consequently, effective 
communication directed at a range of audiences to explain the risks and enlist their 
support through a variety of actions, such as reporting suspicious behaviours, is likely 
to be an even more important feature of counter-terrorism strategies. Despite this, 
there is only limited research addressing effective counter-measures and interventions 
for this sort of attack. This is especially so in terms of communication measures, where 
there is minimal empirical research to identify the most appropriate communication 
strategies or modes of implementation.  
 
Based on a review of existing counter-terrorism communications in the UK and 
Denmark, it becomes clear that there is a wide range of existing communication 
products. However, few are specifically focused on small group or lone actor style 
attacks. Furthermore, whilst the UK has significant campaigns for the prevention, 
interdiction and mitigation stages of an attack, Denmark does not have any large 
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campaigns focused specifically on terrorism interdiction or mitigation. There is little 
data in either country about the effectiveness of communication interventions. 
 
This paper has provided an overview of existing communication challenges in the UK 
and Denmark to provide a much-needed empirical basis to allow the development and 
testing of new or adapted communication measures.  It has highlighted six challenges 
that will need to be addressed and considered during the design or adaptation 
process. Some of these challenges reinforce and add nuance to known challenges, 
such as the lack of state credibility in the eyes of some audiences, whilst others are 
less well understood, such as the issue of counter-communication designed to 
undermine radicalisation prevention communications. 
 
In exploring the challenges and approaches in the UK and Denmark some significant 
differences were identified. The two most important differences were the decision in 
Denmark not to conduct large-scale communication campaigns for fear of scaring the 
public compared to the increasing use of such campaigns in the UK.  Additionally, 
efforts are being made in the UK to recruit credible community and faith voices to 
deliver communications – something that has not yet been prioritised in Denmark. 
Several of the challenges appear particularly acute in the UK. This is partly a 
consequence of a more organised anti-Prevent lobby but primarily stems from the fact 
that the UK delivers more communication products and on a larger scale. Despite 
differences in intensity, the thematic challenges and experiences are strikingly similar 
across the two different contexts, as is message content and audience prioritisation. 
This suggests that findings may be of use to policy-makers in a range of states as they 
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develop or amend their own communication strategies and that similar challenges can 
be expected in different national contexts. 
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